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MICHAEL M. O'HEAR 
THE NEED TO REFORM THE 
ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY" 
ADJUSTMENT 
Michael M. O'Hear* 
Section 3E1.1 provides a two- or three-level 
reduction to the defendant who "clearly demon 
strates acceptance of responsibility for his offense." 
Despite several amendments to the guideline and its 
commentary, the meaning of "acceptance of respon 
sibility" remains vague. As a result, ? 3E1.1 has 
become one of the most frequently litigated guide 
lines, and the Judicial Conference of the United 
States has called for a "fundamental reformation" of 
the provision.1 Much of the confusion may stem 
from a lack of clear purpose in the guideline.2 This 
article identifies two distinct animating principles in 
? 3E1.1?remorse and cooperation?discusses the 
manner in which courts have juggled these prin 
ciples, and proposes a restructuring that would 
refocus the guideline on just one of them. My 
conclusion raises some larger questions about how 
the guidelines handle post-offense conduct. 
I. Background 
Section 3E1.1 grew out of the Commission's 
dilemma in deciding how guilty pleas should be 
treated under the guidelines. During the early 
phases of developing the guidelines, the Commis 
sion considered a proposal to provide a fixed, 
automatic "discount" for guilty pleas.3 Such a 
provision would have codified pre-guideline 
practices. The Commission's data indicated that 
defendants who pled guilty received, on average, 
sentences between thirty and forty percent lower 
than if they had gone to trial.4 Many viewed this 
plea discount as a necessary incentive to encourage 
guilty pleas, and guilty pleas as a necessary lubri 
cant for an overburdened criminal justice system.5 
Indeed, Commission research suggested that eighty 
five percent of federal criminal sentences involved 
some form of plea bargaining.6 The automatic plea 
discount proposal would have retained an incentive 
for such plea bargaining, but in a more predictable 
form than during the pre-guideline era. 
Nonetheless, the original Commission rejected 
the automatic discount, fearing that it might be 
construed as a penalty for defendants who exercised 
their constitutional right to a jury trial.7 Moreover, 
because it awarded a benefit for pleading guilty, 
regardless of the nature of the offense or other post 
offense conduct, it was thought that the proposal 
might result in "unjustified windfalls" to some 
defendants, and "would not be in keeping with the 
public's perception of justice."8 
The Commission thus faced a conundrum: how 
could an encouragement for guilty pleas be built into 
the guidelines without incurring the disadvan 
tages?and perhaps constitutional infirmities?of an 
automatic sentence discount? The Commission 
settled on the unique solution of ? 3E 1.1: rather than 
rewarding guilty pleas per se, it invited judges to 
I provide 
a benefit for "acceptance of responsibility" 
("a/r"). The oddity of this provision is revealed by 
its absence in state guideline systems.9 The Commis 
sion apparently felt that ? 3E1.1 could advance the 
same purposes of an automatic plea discount 
without the unseemly results. What precisely were 
the advantages of the plea discount? 
A. The Cooperation Paradigm 
First, a guilty plea provided immediate, concrete 
benefits to society at large: "such pleas conserve the 
resources of the criminal justice system, and ... 
witnesses (particularly victims) are spared the stress 
of a trial."10 The "acceptance of responsibility" 
provision was designed to advance these interests by 
encouraging guilty pleas, but could also encourage 
other "socially desirable actions," such as "tak[ing] 
affirmative steps towards disassociation from past 
criminal conduct, and . . . rectify [ing] the harm done 
to others."11 The intent of this prong of a/r is to 
provide incentives for a defendant to engage in 
certain socially-desirable conduct?meaning prima 
rily, though not exclusively, pleading guilty? 
between the time of his offense and the time of 
sentencing. This is an expression of what I term the 
"cooperation paradigm" of ? 3E1.1. 
B. The Remorse Paradigm 
In the Commission's view, however, rewarding 
guilty pleas (and a/r) also had another purpose, less 
oriented to gaining immediate benefits for society, 
and more oriented towards giving a break to 
defendants with certain personal characteristics. The 
Commission observed that "the guilty plea 'is the 
first step toward rehabilitation,'"12 and that other 
conduct demonstrating a/r (such as disassociation 
from criminal conduct and rectification of past 
harms) "is a sound indicator of rehabilitative 
potential."13 This hypothesis is associated with the 
second major animating principle of ? 3E1.1, which I 
term the "remorse paradigm." Under this paradigm, 
? 3E1.1 is less concerned with the objective post 
offense conduct of a defendant, and more concerned 
with the defendant's subjective state of mind 
towards his offense. Although conduct is a relevant 
indicator in this inquiry, conduct alone, no matter 
how cooperative, is not dispositive. 
* Law Clerk to Judge Janet Bond Arterton (D. Conn.). The 
views of the author do not necessarily reflect those of Judge 
Arter ton. A longer version of this article will appear in the 
Northwestern Law Review in the summer of1997. 
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C. Balancing the Paradigms 
The Commission thus posited two purposes for 
rewarding a/r: (1) encouraging desirable post 
offense conduct, and (2) recognizing rehabilitative 
potential. The Commission did not clearly indicate 
how judges were to weigh these purposes against 
one another. For instance, what of the defendant 
whose post-offense conduct provided substantial 
social benefits, but whose words and demeanor 
suggested little hope for rehabilitation? What of the 
defendant who went to trial and otherwise signifi 
cantly taxed the criminal justice system, but who 
appeared genuinely to have turned over a new leaf 
in his life? 
The application notes to ? 3E1.1 reflect the 
Commission's attempts to balance the cooperation 
and remorse paradigms. For instance, judges are 
strongly discouraged from awarding the ? 3E1.1 
discount to defendants who go to trial or who 
receive an enhancement under ? 3C1.1 for obstruc 
tion of justice.14 This seems much in the spirit of the 
cooperation paradigm: obstructing justice and 
putting the government to its burden of proof at trial 
may cause a waste of public resources and thwart 
other law enforcement agencies and such behavior is 
clearly to be discouraged. Yet, neither action 
necessarily indicates a lack of remorse or precludes 
the possibility of rehabilitation prior to sentencing. 
However, the defendant who goes to trial or ob 
structs justice is generally excluded from the ? 3E1.1 
benefit, even if he subsequently "admits guilt and 
expresses remorse."15 
Although the guideline's treatment of defen 
dants who go to trial or obstruct justice clearly 
emphasizes the cooperation paradigm, ? 3E1.1 seems 
more oriented on its face towards remorse with 
respect to other defendants. In these cases, the a/r 
inquiry is intended to be open-minded and discre 
tionary. Application note one to ? 3E1.1 lists several 
considerations that are "appropriate" to consider in 
this inquiry, but insists that this list is not meant to 
be exhaustive. Application note five states, "The 
sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a 
defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this 
reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is 
entitled to great deference on review." Why is the 
sentencing judge in such a "unique position"? The 
most obvious explanation lies in the sentencing 
judge's ability to determine whether the defendant 
has a remorseful demeanor. As an earlier draft of 
the application note expanded on this point: "The 
sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate 
whether the offender's post-offense conduct is 
sincere or merely self-serving."16 From this commen 
tary, it is clear that the aspects of the application 
notes emphasizing the discretionary nature of the ? 
3E1.1 inquiry are associated with the remorse 
paradigm. 
II. Judicial Application of Acceptance of 
Responsibility 
Appellate courts generally take application note 
five's requirement of deference quite seriously, and 
tend concurrently to focus on the remorse para 
digm.17 Denials of the a/r adjustment are usually 
upheld when the sentencing court has made any 
sort of express finding that the offender lacks 
contrition, even where the finding is wholly 
conclusory.18 Thus, appellate courts have provided 
little more guidance than has the Commission in 
how to implement the competing principles of ? 
3E1.1.19 
Despite (or perhaps due to) the lack of guidance 
from the Commission and the appellate courts, trial 
courts seem to have largely treated ? 3E1.1 as the 
automatic plea discount that the Commission 
originally considered and rejected. Overall, 84 
percent of defendants receive the adjustment;20 data 
compiled by the Commission suggests that 88 
percent of those who plead guilty receive a reduc 
tion, in comparison to only 20 percent of those who 
go to trial.21 As an Eighth Circuit panel remarked 
upon such data, "It may be that in each case addi 
tional factors [beyond the guilty plea] led the court 
to grant the reduction, but that seems unlikely."22 
Furthermore, because of the lack of guidance 
from the Commission and the appellate courts, there 
is very little constraint on individual judges who 
implement a differing view of ? 3E1.1. And, indeed, 
there is some evidence of disparity. A 1989 analysis 
of four districts in the Eighth Circuit indicated that 
the percentage of defendants pleading guilty who 
receive the ? 3E1.1 adjustment varied from fifty-four 
percent to eighty-six percent.23 A 1992 analysis of 
plea bargaining practices in three cities also pre 
sented evidence of disparity.24 In one district, judges 
awarded the reduction in over ninety percent of 
guilty-plea cases and an astonishing forty percent of 
cases going to trial?twice the national average.25 In 
another district, judges were similarly generous 
with guilty-plea cases, but awarded the discount to 
only twenty-five to thirty percent of defendants 
going to trial.26 
One may also observe disparity in the published 
case law. For instance, in United States v. Harris/7 a 
robbery defendant who pled guilty was denied an 
a/r adjustment for engaging in three types of 
noncooperative behavior: changing address without 
notifying the court, failing a drug test, and failing 
"to take advantage of opportunities for drug 
rehabilitation and counseling."28 In United States v. 
Schultz,29 by contrast, the defendant, who pled guilty 
to a money laundering offense, received a reduction 
notwithstanding an extensive list of similar behav 
iors: failure to complete a prescribed treatment 
program for alcohol abuse, refusal to provide urine 
samples, missed appointments with his probation 
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officer, and an arrest for drunk driving, after which 
the defendant's pretrial release was revoked.30 It 
seems clear that the Schultz court employed a 
different standard for ? 3E1.1 than that applied in 
Harris. 
III. Unresolved Problems with ? 3E1.1 
The present state of ? 3E 1.1 raises numerous 
concerns. The ambiguity of the guideline produces 
an unnecessary quantity of appellate litigation and 
unwarranted sentencing disparity. Ambiguity also 
serves to undermine the underlying policy goals of 
the provision as stated by the Commission, i.e., 
recognizing rehabilitative potential and encouraging 
desired post-offense conduct. If judges focus 
primarily on rewarding desired conduct, then ? 3E1.1 
may not effectively serve to distinguish defendants 
who "enter the correctional system in a frame of 
mind that affords hope for success in rehabilita 
tion"31 from those who do not. If judges focus 
primarily on state of mind, then the ability of ? 3E 1.1 
to encourage desired behavior will be diminished.32 
To the extent that ? 3E1.1 actually functions as a 
plea discount, which seems to be the case in most 
districts, the guideline may also be criticized for a 
certain dishonesty. There is a disjunction between 
the rhetoric of the Commission and the appellate 
courts, which emphasizes remorse, and the reality of 
day-to-day implementation of the guideline. This 
disjunction is troubling in light of the supposed 
"truth in sentencing" goal of the guidelines. The 
need for openness in the context of ? 3E 1.1 may be 
particularly acute, for the provision trenches on the 
rights of defendants to trial by jury. When a 
reduction that is routinely granted to over eighty 
percent of defendants is generally denied to defen 
dants who go to trial, one may easily recon 
ceptualize the "reduction" provision as a penalty 
imposed for exercising a constitutional right. Such a 
penalty may or may not be good public policy, and it 
may or may not be permitted by the Constitution, 
but the precise contours of the penalty should be 
fully open to judicial review and public debate. 
Finally, the remorse element of ? 3E1.1, while 
more prevalent in appellate case law than in the 
practices of district courts, raises a variety of 
concerns in and of itself. Plainly, the remorse 
inquiry will be affected by an offender's perfor 
mance in the court and during meetings with 
probation officers. Yet, quality of performance? 
words of contrition, humble demeanor, etc.?may be 
less a function of "rehabilitative potential" than of 
coaching by a good lawyer, intelligence, mental 
health, and experience in interacting with people 
who belong to the racial and socioeconomic classes 
from which most judges and probation officers 
come.33 A remorse adjustment risks bias against 
certain groups, and may largely reward those 
capable of manipulating the expectations of judges 
and probation officers. As the Ninth Circuit recently 
noted, in a rare appellate decision that explores the 
purposes of ? 3E 1.1 at some length, "There is no 
particular purpose to be served by lenience towards 
those who cry more easily, or have sufficient 
criminal experience to display sentiment at sentenc 
ing instead of restraining their emotions in public."34 
As Judge Frankel has written, "The effort to appraise 
'character' is, to be sure, a parlous one, and not 
necessarily an enterprise for which judges are 
notably equipped by prior training."35 
In light of such concerns, ? 3E1.1 is clearly in 
need of reform. Indeed, the Commission itself has 
not been insensitive to the problems surrounding the 
guideline. In 1991, a working group prepared a 
lengthy report on acceptance of responsibility.36 
Unfortunately, although the working group raised 
important questions concerning ambiguity, dispar 
ity, and appropriate distinctions between different 
types of post-offense conduct, the group's report 
focused on relatively narrow proposals to add an 
extra level of discount to ? 3E 1.1 and to address self 
incrimination concerns that had produced a circuit 
split. The working group's discussion of these 
matters was thoughtful and surely contributed to 
subsequent amendments of the guideline, but the 
bigger questions received short shrift.37 
IV. Proposals for Reform 
As the Judicial Conference has suggested, the 
time is ripe for more substantial reform of ? 3E 1.1. In 
particular, I propose that the provision be clearly 
focused on one purpose, specifically, encouraging 
desired post-offense conduct. Section 3E1.1 might be 
restructured along the following lines: 
? 3E1.1 Adjustment for Cooperative Behavior 
(a) The sentencing judge may reduce the offense 
level by 0 to 3 levels based on the degree to 
which the defendant's post-offense conduct 
facilitates the efficient and fair administration 
of the criminal justice system and the 
recovery and restoration of victims. 
(b) For defendants who plead guilty and do not 
otherwise engage in any significantly 
cooperative or uncooperative conduct, the 
presumptive reduction shall be 2 levels. 
(c) For defendants who go to trial and do not 
otherwise engage in any significantly 
cooperative or uncooperative conduct, the 
presumptive reduction shall be 0 levels. 
This proposal is consistent with the spirit of the 
recent Judicial Conference proposal, which seeks to 
reform ? 3E1.1 such that the guideline will no longer 
"tr[y] to do too much with one adjustment."38 
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However, the reconceptualization of ? 3E1.1 pro 
posed here as a cooperation adjustment may lend 
even greater clarity and coherence to the guideline 
than the Judicial Conference's proposal.39 
The cooperation adjustment is generally 
consistent with existing practices. Those who plead 
guilty will routinely receive a benefit and those who 
go to trial will not. But, also as in the present 
system, these adjustments would not be automatic: 
defendants who plead guilty may still lose their 
benefit for violating the terms of pretrial release, 
obstructing justice, or engaging in comparably poor 
behavior. Defendants who go to trial may still 
qualify for a reduction based on other aspects of 
post-offense conduct. Judges would have greater 
flexibility in awarding ? 3E1.1 benefits: rather than 
an all-or-nothing two-point reduction with a 
potential third-point available to a small class of 
defendants, judges would be permitted to reduce 
any sentence by one, two, or three points.40 On the 
other hand, judges would be precluded from 
denying the benefit based on unremorseful de 
meanor or on statements by the defendant not rising 
to the level of obstruction of justice. In short, the 
remorse paradigm would be stripped out of ? 3E1.1.41 
Alternatively, the Commission might consider 
either returning to the notion of a fixed, automatic 
plea discount, or eliminating ? 3E1.1 altogether. 
Both solutions would address the current ambiguity 
of the guideline, as well as the problematic role of 
remorse in the current system, but both of these 
solutions present difficulties of their own. A plea 
discount offers less flexibility than a cooperation 
discount, leaving much cooperative behavior 
unrewarded, and possibly producing the sorts of 
unseemly results that originally concerned the 
Commission. Eliminating ? 3E1.1 altogether would 
likewise reduce incentives for cooperative post 
offense conduct. Indeed, removing ? 3E1.1 would 
take away the one explicit plea inducement provi 
sion in the guidelines. Much research suggests that 
plea bargaining would still continue without such a 
provision,42 but elimination of ? 3E 1.1 might "drive 
plea inducements further underground, with the 
result of even more arbitrariness and disparity."43 
V. The Broader Issues 
The problems of acceptance and plea induce 
ment point to larger dilemmas of guideline sentenc 
ing, particularly the proper treatment of post-offense 
conduct. Such conduct is presently handled in a 
fragmentary way, touched on by such disparate 
provisions as ? 3E1.1, ? 5K1.1 (departure for substan 
tial assistance to authorities), ? 3C1.1 (obstructing or 
impeding the administration of justice), ? 3C1.2 
(reckless endangerment during flight), and ? 1B1.3 
(relevant conduct). A reform of ? 3E1.1, such as I 
have proposed, that places the guideline more clearly 
among this body of provisions invites reconsidera 
tion of how these provisions relate to one another 
and fit into the guideline scheme as a whole. 
The linkages between ? 5K1.1 and ? 3E1.1, 
particularly when the latter is conceptualized as a 
cooperation adjustment, are especially noteworthy. 
The substantial assistance provision seems a rather 
anomalous guideline at present: defendants who 
provide "substantial" assistance in the investigation 
or prosecution of another person, and who receive a 
motion for departure from the government, may 
benefit from a potentially limitless downward 
departure?they may be sentenced anywhere below 
the suggested guideline range. But defendants who, 
try as they might, do not succeed in providing the 
right kind or degree of assistance?maybe simply 
because they are small-time criminals who are not 
capable of aiding the prosecution of others?or who 
cannot obtain favorable treatment from a fickle 
prosecutor, are not provided any express benefit 
under the guidelines.44 Yet, a defendant may 
provide meaningful assistance to the government that 
does not rise to the level of substantial, as, for 
instance, by pleading guilty. 
My proposal would render ? 5K1.1 less anoma 
lous by clearly providing incentives for intermediate 
assistance. Yet, such reform would also underscore 
other problematic aspects of ? 5K1.1. Why, for 
instance, should the ? 5K1.1 benefit only be available 
upon a prosecutor's motion, while ?3E1.1 rests on a 
judge's discretion? Why should ? 5K1.1 entirely 
"drop the floor" from beneath a defendant, while 
? 3E1.1 provides a benefit subject to clear limitations? 
Perhaps the two provisions should be combined, or at 
least restructured, so as to function in a more comple 
mentary fashion. 
The chapter 3C guidelines, which provide 
enhancements for obstruction of justice and reckless 
endangerment during flight, might also be better 
integrated with a reformed ? 3E1.1. Both obstruc 
tion and reckless endangerment seem quite appro 
priate considerations in a cooperation inquiry. In 
the interests of simplicity and clarity, the 3C 
guidelines might thus be eliminated altogether.45 
Merger of 3C and 3E would also diminish the 
current problem that defendants who plead guilty 
are subject to much greater penalties for obstruction 
than defendants who go to trial. The defendant who 
pleads will normally receive a two or three level 
reduction, but if such a defendant obstructs justice, 
he will receive the two-level ? 3C1.1 enhancement 
and also lose his ? 3E1.1 benefit. Merger would 
permit similar acts of obstruction to be treated 
similarly, regardless of mode of conviction. 
Enlarging the scope of a reformed ? 3E1.1 and 
merging the provision with other guidelines might 
thus enhance their integrity. However, larger 
questions remain: How should non-offense conduct 
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be weighed in the context of a sentencing scheme 
designed to "avoid unwarranted sentencing dispari 
ties among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct?"46 How 
can the principle of proportionality in sentencing be 
reconciled with the purely utilitarian imperatives 
that lie behind something like a cooperation adjust 
ment? How can the magnitude of adjustments for 
post-offense conduct be appropriately scaled, such 
that the number of levels added or subtracted bears 
some rational relationship to the implicit ranking of 
social harms set forth in Chapter Two? 
VI. Conclusion 
However it addresses such questions, the 
Commission would do well to bear in mind one of 
the most salient lessons of the ? 3E1.1 experience: 
The institutional pressures and constraints facing 
district courts, as well as the individual perspectives 
of sentencing judges, impose significant limitations 
on top-down sentencing reforms. Although the 
Commission expressly disavowed an automatic plea 
benefit, ? 3E1.1 has generally become just that. 
Indeed, ?3E1.1 is not the only example of this 
phenomenon; other observers have noted the 
pressures for masked avoidance of the guidelines.47 
Thus, it is far from clear that unwarranted disparity 
is any less frequent now than in the pre-guideline 
era.48 Guided discretion in sentencing remains a 
compelling vision; however, guidance will not 
succeed unless sentencing actors are willing and able 
to be guided. Guidance must be clear, principled, 
and ultimately founded on the accumulated wisdom 
of the nation's sentencing courts. 
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among the populations of defendants being sentenced?for 
instance, the defendants in one district may actually be 
more remorseful than those in the others. Unfortunately, 
strictly numerical comparisons, such as those offered by 
Judge Heaney, are not able to incorporate such factors into 
the analysis. 
24 See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of 
Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining 
Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 501 (1992). 
25 See id. at 531, 550. 
26 See id. at 540. The Nagel & Schulhofer study does 
not provide exact numbers because the authors wished to 
preserve the anonymity of the districts they studied. 
2713 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 1994). 
28 Id. at 557. The appellate court upheld the denial of a 
reduction on these grounds. 
29 880 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Ind. 1995). 
30 Id. at 608-09. The court remarked simply, "Mr. 
Schultz performed poorly with respect to the conditions of 
his pretrial supervision." 
31 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1969). 
32 As Professor Schulhofer has observed, "The line of 
thought reflected in [cases in which the remorse aspect of 
a/r is emphasized], if pursued seriously, could quickly 
destroy the value of the acceptance-of-responsibility 
discount as a plea-inducing device." Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Implementing the Plea Agreement Provisions of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 Fed. Sent. R. 179,180 (1991). 
33For examples of two troubling cases in which a 
defendant was denied the ? 3E1.1 reduction for oral 
statements made to the court, not withstanding evidence of 
mental illness, see United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175 
(2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161 (2d 
Cir. 1990). Altman was reversed on appeal; Echevarria was 
not. 
"United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152,1159 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
35 United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233,1236 (2d Cir. 
1974). 
36 See Working Group Report, supra note 21. 
37 For instance, it is difficult to discern the source of 
the working group's confident conclusion, "Although 
variations with respect to the application of the acceptance 
of responsibility adjustment do exist, the Commission may 
conclude that they are not too pronounced." Id. at 7. 
Elsewhere, the working group noted, "Several statements 
[of individuals interviewed in connection with a broader 
study of the Guidelines] suggest that acceptance of 
responsibility is applied differently across the nation and 
within a given district." Id. at 24. Moreover, the working 
group's cursory review of a random sample of case files 
revealed a number of troubling results, including three 
cases in which defendants received the a/r adjustment 
despite going to trial and despite maintaining their 
innocence after conviction. Finally, the working group's 
data on variation was maddeningly incomplete. For 
instance, the report states that in only five districts do 
judges grant the reduction to fewer than seventy-five 
percent of defendants who plead guilty. Id. at 6. How 
ever, the report does not indicate how much below 
seventy-five percent those districts are, whether there are 
any districts that are outliers in the opposite direction (e.g., 
granting the adjustment to more than ninety percent of 
defendants who plead), or whether significant variation 
exists within districts. 
38 
Judicial Conference Amendment, supra note 1, at 1. On 
January 2, the Commission published a proposed amend 
ment that would modify ? 3E1.1 in significant ways. 62 
Fed. Reg. 179-80 (1997) (Amendment 24). This proposal 
would also narrow the scope of the a/r inquiry, at least 
with respect to the two-level reduction provided in 
3El.l(a). Amendment 24 will be further examined in a 
subsequent Issue of FSR. 
39 The Judicial Conference's approach, delineated in 
three alternative proposals, divides the ? 3E1.1 inquiry 
into distinct and independent inquiries. For instance, 
"Option 2" would award a one-point reduction to 
defendants who demonstrate "acceptance of responsibil 
ity," one point to defendants who plead guilty, and an 
additional point to defendants who plead guilty in a 
"timely" manner. Id. at 6. Thus, the proposal would leave 
the ambiguous concept of "acceptance of responsibility" in 
the guidelines, but would reduce its significance to one 
point. In contrast, my proposal would remove "acceptance 
of responsibility" from the guideline altogether and 
expressly focus the ? 3E1.1 inquiry on cooperation. These 
changes would leave the guideline both more objective and 
more capable of recognizing the range of post-offense 
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conduct that society might wish to encourage. My 
proposal may be similarly differentiated from the 
Commission's proposed Amendment 24. 
40 
Granting judges discretion to reduce any sentence 
by as many as three points may raise problems with 
respect to the "25% rule." 28 U.S.C. ? 994(b)(2). Under the 
traditional "inclusive" interpretation, "the 25% rule applies 
to all steps in the guideline process, restricting all kinds of 
guideline formulations available, and requiring numerical 
adjustments for each sentencing factor." Catharine M. 
Goodwin, Background of the AO Memorandum Opinion on the 
25% Rule, 8 Fed. Sent. R. 109 (1995). If this interpretation is 
accepted, then the third point of a/r adjustment may have 
to be limited to defendants with high offense levels, as is 
presently the case under ? 3E1.1. However, critics of the 
inclusive interpretation have argued convincingly that the 
25% rule should be limited to its plain meaning, i.e., that 
the rule is only applicable to the ranges in the Sentencing 
Table itself. Id. 
41 One of the purposes of the proposal is to reduce the 
role of remorse in sentencing, which I find to be problematic 
in light of the difficulties of truly knowing a defendant's 
mind based on generally brief courtroom encounters and in 
light of the risk that the assessment of remorse may be 
clouded by issues of race, class, temperament, criminal 
experience, and mental illness. However, my proposal 
would not wholly preclude judges from taking account of a 
defendant's attitude in sentencing: a judge could use 
remorse as a basis for sentencing at the bottom of the 
applicable range, or defiance for sentencing at the top. 
Remorse might also be a basis for departure?indeed, 
remorse-based departures would grow more easy under my 
proposal because it would be clear that the Commission did 
not already take remorse into account in ? 3E1.1. However, 
under my proposal there would be less room overall for 
remorse-based considerations in sentencing. Attitude would 
be only one factor most judges would want to take into 
account in sentencing within a range, and the size of the 
range is itself rather limited in many cases. Departures 
would provide greater degrees of recognition for remorse, 
but would be subject to a much more searching form of 
appellate scrutiny than the current a/r determinations. 
42 Several studies suggest that plea differentials persist 
even when jurisdictions "ban" plea bargaining. See, e.g., 
Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 279, 316-17; Robert A. Weninger, 
The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso 
County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 265,311 (1987). For a 
discussion of the subtle tools of plea inducement available to 
prosecutors above and beyond ? 3E1.1, see Nagel & 
Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 547-49. 
43 
Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 180 (discussing 
consequences on plea-bargaining of remorse-oriented 
decisions). 
44 The absence of any provision in the guidelines to ben 
efit defendants who provide assistance to the authorities but 
fail to obtain a prosecutor's motion for departure seems curi 
ous in light of 28 U.S.C. ? 994(n), which requires the Commis 
sion to "assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropri 
ateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be 
imposed ... to take into account a defendant's substantial as 
sistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person 
who has committed an offense." 
45 If this reform were adopted, ? 3E1.1 should be 
restructured so that it could provide a net enhancement, 
rather than just a net reduction; otherwise, defendants who 
went to trial would generally not be subject to penalties for 
obstruction or reckless endangerment because such 
defendants would presumptively not receive a ? 3E1.1 
adjustment anyway?leaving such defendants with literally 
nothing to lose by obstruction or endangerment. 
4618 U.S.C. ? 3553. 
47 Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of 
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 
101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1726-27 (1992). 
48Id. at 1684 n.5 (citing survey of federal district 
judges). 
Appendix 
In a letter dated December 5,1995, Judge Maryanne 
Trump Barry, Chairwoman of the Committee on Criminal 
Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States, wrote a 
letter to Judge Richard Conaboy, Chairman of the United 
States Sentencing Commission, urging that the Commis 
sion consider two amendments to the sentencing guidelines, 
notwithstanding the Commission's initiation of a broader 
program to review and assess the guidelines. One of these 
"specific and narrowly focused amendments" concerned 
revision of ? 3E1.1. Following are the relevant portions of 
the Judicial Conference's submission to Judge Conaboy. 
I. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ? 3E1.1 
(ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY) 
Fundamental reformation of the acceptance of 
responsibility guideline, ? 3E1.1, is needed, primarily 
because the various factors which comprise the 
current "acceptance" adjustment interact with each 
other not only to generate needless litigation, but to 
deny the utility of a separate, independent incentive 
solely for the entry of a plea. As a consequence, either 
the other factors interfere with the court's ability to 
reward a plea, or, if the reduction is rewarded for a 
plea, the other factors are lost. The court is unable to 
distinguish between a begrudging, reluctant timely 
plea (for which the full three points must be 
awarded), and a timely "plea plus" where the 
defendant pleads as well as shows genuine remorse, 
demonstrates assistance to authorities, has undergone 
post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and/or some of the 
other factors which the guideline attempts to reward. 
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A. Interfering Factors: Need for Separate 
Plea Incentive 
The case law indicates continued confusion with 
the way the acceptance of responsibility guideline has 
come to be interpreted. Astonishingly, the acceptance 
guideline accounts for the third highest number of 
appeals.1 This confusion is generated by the interac 
tion and definition of the numerous factors listed in 
the current acceptance guideline, all of which 
comprise the vague concept of "acceptance."2 Com 
mission data shows that nearly a third of the appeals 
in FY 1994 involving this guideline were based on 
"application and definition issues."3 
Factors such as how much the defendant has to 
"admit" (or not "falsely deny"), the timeliness of the 
plea, the extent of the defendant's remorse, or the 
extent of the government's "preparation," account for 
much of the litigation and confusion surrounding this 
guideline, because the determination of the entire 
guideline can turn on these issues. Worse, they cloud 
and complicate the court's efforts, and need, to 
reward the entry of a plea in order to conserve judicial 
and other resources. The current guideline tries to do 
too much with one adjustment (the separate adjust 
ment has not been effective, as discussed below), and 
consequently it does not serve any of its numerous 
goals well. 
Any plea incentive is inextricably intertwined 
with issues of attitude, other conduct, the 
government's preparation, etc. which either get lost in 
the overwhelming thrust to reward a plea, or worse, 
prevent the plea incentive from working. How does a 
court reward the entry of a plea where the defendant 
has done something (perhaps submitted a bad urine 
sample) which arguably prevents the allowance of the 
first 2-level adjustment? There is no way to provide a 
reward for the many non-plea incentives listed in 
? 3E1.1 if the court rewards the entry of the plea; the 
other incentives either over-come the plea incentive, 
or vice versa. In a case where the defendant agrees to 
simply enter a timely plea, and if the court rewards 
the plea, it must do so with the full three points (as 
discussed below), with no adjustment left to act as an 
incentive for the other commendable conduct which 
the guideline attempts to encourage. 
The Commission has always stopped short of 
allowing an adjustment solely for the entry of a plea. 
The plea incentive is merely one of many incentives. 
"Plea" is not even mentioned in the 2-level adjust 
ment part of the guideline. However, the Commis 
sion has moved in the direction of directly rewarding 
a plea. A 1990 amendment sought to clarify that the 
adjustment is generally not available to a defendant 
who puts the government to its proof at trial, express 
ing remorse only on conviction.4 In addition, a 1992 
amendment moved from guideline to commentary 
the statement that the court could consider imposing 
the reduction without regard to whether the convic 
tion was based on a plea or a trial, and it added the 
third level adjustment, one basis for which is the 
entry of an early plea.5 
B. Constitutionality of Separate Plea Incentive 
The Commission need not be reluctant to 
provide a direct incentive for a plea, because it is clear 
from long-standing Supreme Court law, as well as a 
comprehensive reading of appellate cases on the 
current guideline, that a plea reward would be 
upheld as constitutional and justified by the benefit 
which a plea brings the system. The rationale would 
no doubt be the same as that used by the Supreme 
Court in upholding plea bargaining, a procedure 
which offers a discounted sentence for a plea in order 
to provide the benefit of the plea to the system. 
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
constitutionality of the current acceptance of respon 
sibility guideline,6 it has established a solid body of 
case law upholding plea bargaining practices or 
statutes which result in lower sentences for those who 
plead than for those who go to trial. In Corbitt v. New 
Jersey, 439 US. 212, 99 S. Ct. 492 (1978), a New Jersey 
statute was challenged that mandated a life sentence 
for a defendant convicted by a jury of first degree 
murder, but allowed the possibility of a lesser 
sentence if the defendant entered a plea. The 
Supreme Court held that states may encourage guilty 
pleas by reducing the sentences imposed after a plea. 
The court stated that "not every burden on the 
exercise of a constitutional right and not every 
pressure or encouragement to waive such a right is 
invalid." Id. at 2187 Similarly, in Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978), the 
Court upheld the government's right to withhold 
leniency for a homicide defendant who went to trial, 
and held that the key to the constitutionality of plea 
bargaining is whether the defendant has the freedom 
to choose between sentence options. 
In these cases the court relied on its own 
previous cases sustaining plea bargaining, a practice 
which inherently rewards pleas and "penalizes" 
those who go to trial. For example, in U.S. v. Brady, 
397 U.S. 742, 752, 90 S. Ct. 1463,1471 (1970), the 
Court held that the preservation of prosecutorial and 
judicial resources justifies a sentencing scheme that 
favors guilty pleas and justifies plea bargaining. 
These same rationales would apply to a sentence 
reduction for the entry of a plea in the guideline 
context.8 
C The All or Nothing, "Tello" Problem 
An extra, third point adjustment for an early 
plea or cooperation was added in 1992.9 While the 
goal might have been to provide more flexibility in 
rewarding particularly early pleas, the result in 
practice has been to require all three levels for any 
plea which is conceivably "timely." Its potential 
usefulness was limited by the fact that the defendant 
must have qualified for the 2-level provision before 
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he or she can be considered for the extra, third level 
adjustment. 
The courts have reinforced this tie, as demon 
strated by U.S. v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1993), 
where the court held that once a court awards the 2 
level adjustment for a "timely" plea, the court has no 
discretion but to award the third point, as well. In 
that case the defendant gave false information to the 
probation officer about his criminal history and 
caused additional investigation to be conducted. The 
sentencing court increased the sentence for obstruc 
tion, but, in spite of the guidelines' admonition to the 
contrary,10 the sentencing court also gave the defen 
dant the 2-level acceptance reduction because he 
entered a "timely" plea, but withheld the third level 
reduction because of the obstruction. The Fifth 
Circuit held that the court had no discretion to 
withhold the extra level if it imposed the 2-levels on 
the basis of a timely plea. The court said that the 
obstruction "evaporated" once the court awarded the 
2-points, and then all that mattered was whether the 
criteria of the extra point reduction applied.11 There 
fore, the court must award 3 levels, if any at all, for a 
timely plea, with no ability to adjust the total reduc 
tion for any of the other factors involved. 
Nor could the court have done the reverse: deny 
the 2-level adjustment because of the obstruction (or 
some other non-plea reason), but impose the one 
level adjustment to attempt to reward the timely plea. 
This was, in fact, what the sentencing court tried to 
do in U.S. v. Solis, 39 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 1994). There it 
did not award the 2-levels in ? 3El.l(a) for several 
reasons, mostly unrelated to timeliness of the plea, 
but then imposed the 1-level for the timely plea. The 
sentence was reversed on appeal. However, the 
appellate court noted the irony that the one point 
provision (which mentions a plea) cannot be imposed 
if the 2-point provision (which does not mention a 
plea) is denied, even for some non-plea reason. 
These cases illustrate not only the problem with 
the extra point adjustment, but also the need for a 
separate plea incentive, in order to avoid confusion 
and interference between the reward for a plea and 
the reward (or withholding of the reward) for the 
other incentives provided in the guideline. 
D. Conclusion 
The current guideline has generated confusion 
and litigation. More importantly, it does not allow 
the court to distinguish between a defendant who 
merely pleads guilty and one who also does some of 
the things described in Application Note 1. Admit 
tedly a court could decide that merely pleading guilty 
is not enough to be "acceptance of responsibility." 
However, all courts are confronted with the inescap 
able fact that, with the increasing federalization of 
crime, our criminal justice system could not function 
without a large number of guilty pleas, even if the 
defendant is willing to do little more than enter the 
plea. Our proposal recognizes that reality, but allows 
an additional decrease for the defendant who does 
more. Options 2 and 3 would make a clear distinction 
between a guilty plea and a "timely" guilty plea. We 
would also support a possible 4-level discount in 
larger cases, as in Option 3, if the Sentencing Commis 
sion determines this to be acceptable. 
Application Note 1 would remain substantially as 
it is, as a listing of criteria applicable to the determina 
tion of the "acceptance of responsibility" provision in 
our proposals. We suggest that a factor be added to 
that listing: whether the defendant cooperated with 
the probation officer in providing information 
necessary for the preparation of the presentence 
report. The remainder of the commentary would be 
streamlined to a bare minimum. 
E. Proposed Guidelines: ? 3E1.1 
The Committee asks that the Commission adopt 
one of the following amendments, as a replacement 
for the current acceptance of responsibility guideline: 
? 3E1.1 Acceptance of Responsibility 
Option 1: 
(a) Decrease the offense level by up to 3 levels 
according to the following, independently deter 
mined, factors: 
(1) If the defendant timely enters a plea of 
guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid 
preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate 
its resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 2 
levels; and 
(2) If the defendant otherwise clearly demon 
strates acceptance of responsibility for the offense, 
decrease the offense level by 1 level. 
(b) Notwithstanding the above, if the 
defendant's offense level determined prior to the 
operation of this guideline is below 16, decrease the 
offense level by no more than 2 levels for this 
guideline. 
Option 2: 
(a) Decrease the offense level by up to 3 levels 
according to the following, independently deter 
mined, factors: 
(1) If the defendant enters a plea of guilty, 
decrease the offense level by 1 level; 
(2) If the plea of guilty is timely entered, thereby 
permitting the government to avoid preparing for 
trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources 
efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 level; and 
(3) If the defendant otherwise clearly demon 
strates acceptance of responsibility for the offense, 
decrease the offense level by 1 level. 
(b) Notwithstanding the above, if the 
defendant's offense level determined prior to the 
operation of this guideline is below 16, decrease the 
offense level by no more than 2 levels for this guide 
line. 
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Option 3: 
(a) Decrease the offense level by up to 4 levels 
according to the following, independently deter 
mined, factors: 
(1) If the defendant enters a plea of guilty, 
decrease the offense level by 2 levels; 
(2) If the plea of guilty is timely entered, thereby 
permitting the government to avoid preparing for 
trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources 
efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 level; and 
(3) If the defendant otherwise clearly demon 
strates acceptance of responsibility for the offense, 
decrease the offense level by 1 level. 
(b) Notwithstanding the above, if the 
defendant's offense level determined prior to the 
operation of this guideline is below 16, decrease the 
offense level by no more than 2 levels for this guide 
line. 
NOTES 
1 
Appeals involving this guideline number third among 
appeals by defendants (only those involving the drug 
guidelines and relevant conduct were more numerous), and 
third among appeals by the government (only those 
involving the drug guidelines and departures were more 
numerous). Tables 66 and 67, 1994 Annual Report, U.S. 
Sentencing Commission. 
2 See numerous factors and interface of factors 
discussed in case annotations in Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Handbook, Roger W. Haines, Jr., Editor, pp. 473 
482, 1994 edition. 
3 1994 Annual Report, U.S. Sentencing Commission, p. 
146. Another quarter of the appeals involved "conduct 
necessary to receive the adjustment," and another quarter 
involved whether the defendant admitted conduct compris 
ing the offense or how timely the notice of plea was. Id. 
4 Amendment 351, Appendix C, Guidelines Manual 
(expanding Application Note 2). 
5 Amendment 459, Appendix C, Guidelines Manual, 
effective November 1, 1992. 
6 
However, one Justice has dissented from the Court's 
denial of certiorari to resolve the circuit split on the issue of 
whether denying the adjustment when the defendant 
refuses to disclose potentially incriminating information 
beyond the offense of conviction is a denial of the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. Kinder v. U.S., 504 
U.S. 946, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992) (mem.) (J. White, dissenting). 
7 The Court demonstrated that this principle has a 
limit, however, ten years earlier in U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 
570, 572, 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968), where it held that the state 
could not make the death penalty available only for 
defendants who go to trial. 
8 
Similarly, the circuit courts have universally found 
that not only does ? 3E1.1 not constitute a per se punishment 
for going to trial (see, e.g., U.S. v. Sounders, 973 F.2d 1354, 
1362 (7th Cir. 1992) for thorough discussion), but, to the 
extent that it might chill the exercise of the right to go to 
trial, it is still constitutional, based on the reasons advanced 
by the Supreme Court in plea bargaining cases: even if a 
provision were to burden or chill a constitutional right, (1) 
the legitimate societal interest in conserving prosecutorial 
and judicial resources justifies the reward of a plea; and (2) 
the denial of the adjustment is the denial of a benefit, not the 
imposition of a penalty. See, e.g., U.S. v. Henry, 883 F.2d 
1010 (11th Cir. 1989). 
9 Amendment 459, Appendix C, Guidelines Manual, 
effective November 1,1992. 
10 Note 4 of the acceptance guideline, ? 3E1.1, says that 
only in an extraordinary case would acceptance of responsi 
bility be awarded where obstruction has been imposed. 11 Id. at 1128. 
